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sin, and the presence in human nature of lawless tendencies and impulses, the true self can only be developed aright with the aid of a certain measure of discipline and restraint. Conversely, the aim of all self-repression is the development of personality, the enlargement of capacities for service. Accordingly we are prepared to find an ascetic element in Christianity, a call to self-denial and sacrifice" (pp. 214, 215; also p. 183). The inadequacy of this explanation as a theoretical solution becomes apparent when we contemplate the possibility of a man more or less free from 'lawless tendencies and impulses,' called upon to sacrifice his life for others,—a real possibility illustrated once for all in the case of Jesus Christ.

One feels, however, that the absence of strict systematic treatment has its advantages. It enables a writer to keep more closely to the facts of life as a rule, and to illustrate the ideal more concretely. Our author's treatment profits in this respect by his method. It is eminently practical and sane. It avoids extreme theories. Moreover, it succeeds in presenting Christian morality in an attractive form, owing largely to the fact that particular duties are shown in the light of the ideal of a full life, a life which the author seems convinced Christ is able to produce in all who surrender to him.

Of special interest at the present time is Part IV, containing a discussion of Christian ideals in relation to the Family, the State, and the Church. Such questions as the problem of divorce, prohibited degrees, restriction of births, disestablishment and disendowment, religious conformity, 'interpretation' of the creed, etc., are frankly faced. We cannot do more than refer to them within the limits of this review. Professor Otley's views are important as representing the moderate opinion of the Anglican Church on these subjects.

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PERSONALITY AND THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL. By John Wright Buckingham. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1909. Pp. vii, 263.

The general idea of this book is a fruitful one; it is that of concentrating on a single problem light from as many sources as possible. This method has produced some of the great books of the past, and from it are sure to come other great books in

the future. Thus it has recently been pointed out that James's "Psychology" is a work of art, in which physiological psychology, experimental psychology, and pathology have been drawn upon and their results made to converge upon particular problems. Ordinarily, we have to unite and compare the conclusions of specialists for ourselves, but when a competent author undertakes to help us in this way his service is welcome. This is one reason for the great hold of the "Republic" on the world. It contains poetry, philosophy, preaching, a psychological interpretation of society, and an ideal social construction in one concrete, organic whole. And this author writes because he believes that "the paths of philosophy, psychology, ethics, and theology which have been diverging more and more since the middle of the nineteenth century are once more converging,—at the point of personality," and because he desires "to help to a further understanding of personality, especially in the wealth of its meaning in and for Christianity."

To the performance of his task the writer brings a comprehensive mind, a generous spirit, great moral insight, and a clear literary style. He holds the sympathy of his reader, even when his logic is unsatisfactory. Indeed, this is no book for a pedant to review. Certain chapters glow with earnestness and are marked by great nobility of thought. Chapter XII, *e. g.*, is really an inspiring sermon on Kant's great text: "Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, as an end, never merely as a means." In reading this appeal, so fine and clear and true, the critic forgets his criticism and asks himself if he has sinned. To criticise such passages is ungracious and inhuman, for they are not the mere expression of an idea that may be examined in cold blood, but rather the upholding of a noble ideal which our hearts will not let us reject. Chapter XIII, on "The Personalizing of Life," is of the same order. In general, the preaching of the book is splendid, far better, in the opinion of the reviewer, than its psychology and philosophy. Much of it is a restatement of some of the noblest ideas of the New Testament and of historic Christianity in the technical terms of modern thought, and in this part of his work the author is singularly interesting and suggestive. Again and again, famous passages in the Christian Scriptures are made to appear like a window of heaven through which shines a light irradiating and beautifying human life.

The philosophical position of the book has been concisely put in a few sentences in the chapter on "Personality and Individuality." "Individuality thus differentiates itself from personality as belonging to the natural order, a distinctively racial product, while personality belongs to the eternal order and is an intrinsic reality. Individuality is the concentration of racial, indeed of cosmic life and acquisition in a single race unit." It is "only the product of a nature process, the final link in a chain of cosmic succession, . . . the segregated unit of a common racial life. . . . The human individual is thus the crown and summit of the natural series, the consummation of the evolutionary process of individuation. As such he is most express and admirable, but this does not make him a person." What, then, does? Since he cannot attain to personality by continued evolution, something has to be added on, something from a world of other dimensions. "Individuality is a time product, a 'life phenomenon'; personality is a supertemporal noumenon. The person is not susceptible to organic decay and disintegration. It is only as he admits disabling and destructive forces of his own spiritual order that he degenerates. Physical forces cannot directly affect the person. . . . The evolutionary cycle does not take place in the realm of the personal."

In the light of the last sentence, the reader wonders what to make of the statement that frequently occurs, that personality develops, that it is a matter of degree, etc. The chasm between the empirical personality and the real is made so steep and deep and wide that it seems impossible to bridge it, and an organic view of human nature is in danger of being lost. The passage in which it is stated that "that which relates the True Self and the empirical self to one another, determining which shall be dominant and controlling, is the *Will*," I do not find intelligible.

As to the origin of this True Self, we have nothing more definite than the statement that it comes "from above." "That higher selfhood is not an evolution from below; it is an impartation from above." But this, we are warned, does not mean pre-existence of our diviner part. This is "supertemporal," "and that which is above time, though it may be intimately related to the time order, cannot be simply a time product." If our finite personalities are created at all, it must be by "*Eternal creation*," which, it is explained, "*means, a Perfect*

Self so timelessly imparting itself to an imperfect self, and thus so constituting it, that the relation is at least not less than that of Creator and created."

To such straits is one reduced when he dichotomizes human nature and attributes the origin of one part to a natural and of the other to a supernatural world! Can anybody but a sophisticated Kantian even suppose himself able to think such thoughts? After "eternal generation," the reader is not surprised to find the Logos idea of the Fourth Gospel, the Trinity, and other characteristic doctrines of evangelical Christianity rehabilitated and defended by similar arguments. Not only is ordinary human nature dislocated, but we are told that Christ, as the True Self, must be distinguished from Jesus of Nazareth. The former is the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, the latter being an empirical personality. Between God and nature much the same relation exists. For those who already hold the Christian faith in this form, this may be very helpful and illuminating, but for those who do not, the discussion is obviously not profitable. It may be true, as the author says, that "each of us belongs to two orders of existence,—the eternal order and the time order," but it does not seem legitimate to use the former as a refuge into which one may escape when hard pressed by difficulties of explanation in the latter. The physicist does not carry his solution as far as possible, and then attribute effects of unknown causes to divine agency. For the modern mind generally it is "all God or none." So, the importation of an incomprehensible noumenon adds nothing to our understanding of the empirical or natural, but rather deprives it of all significance. And it is rather strange that this writer does not discuss the view toward which the logic of modern thought tends, namely, that the difference between individuality and personality is really a difference of degree, the latter being the highest product of evolution.

It would be an injustice, however, to dwell too much on the philosophical difficulties presented by this book, seeing that it is not merely a work on philosophy. Ethically, it is of great value, for it lays the stress where it ought to be laid, on personality. The victorious tone of many of its pages is the tone we need to take and keep. The majestic ideal of a self-ruling spirit is admirably presented, and the spirit of the writer is contagious, so that the reader finds himself desiring to be more of a person

than he has been before and to attain to the state in which "there is no more cowering before fate, no more surrender of self-respect to escape the hand of abuse. The soul has awakened to the fact that it is stronger than all its enemies and is at rest."

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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View. By Marion LeRoy Burton, B.D., Ph.D., President of Smith College. Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. Pp. 234.

This is a weighty and important treatment of an ever-interesting theme. The book has eight chapters of careful and condensed review and appreciation, as well as criticism, of Augustine's theory of evil. It starts with a clear statement of the questions by which Augustine was confronted in his apology for Christianity. In opposition to Manichæism he had to maintain the unity and the all-controlling sovereignty of God. Dr. Burton points out the uncompromising attitude Augustine took on the subject of whether God was the source of all things, and shows that in Augustine's theory nature was God's creation, and therefore must be inherently good. Augustine, however, also taught, as Dr. Burton shows, that nature was created *ex nihilo*, and thus opens the way for his doctrine of sin as privative, and a *deficiens*. He also confuses *malum* and *peccatum*, and in his discussion of what is *malum* declares it to be a *privatio boni*, a corruption or negation, and hence not a created nature. Then in the third and fourth chapters the author gathers together Augustine's answer to the question: Whence comes the evil? Quite justly it is pointed out that Augustine definitely tried to reject the Manichæism and its dualism in which he had lived for nine years; and in a rapid but most admirable survey of the important passages Dr. Burton shows how Augustine rejected the evil principle theory; the theory of its source in nature; the preëxistence theory; the "flesh" theory, and the theory of contrast. Then he goes on to show how firmly Augustine held and defended the theory that sin was in the will, and that whether in the preëxistent world of angels or in the world of human life the seat of evil was with Augustine always regarded as being found in the will.